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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of state-level personal tax rates on state tax revenue and
individual welfare. The policy analysis based on a general equilibrium model suggests that
tax revenues would benet from higher wage-income, sales or property taxes, while any in-
crease in dividend-income tax would result in a reduction of revenues. It is also shown that
individuals would su¤er from an increase in state-level wage-income tax, dividend-tax or sales
tax, while they would benet from an increase in property taxes. The heterogeneity across
states is determined by a TaxIndex, a weighted average of initial taxes at the state level.
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1. Introduction
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 had a devastating e¤ect on state nances in the U.S. when
states took in $87 billion less in tax revenue from October 2008 through September 2009 than they
collected in the previous 12 months; this corresponds to a decline of 11 percent, the steepest on
record, resulted from the impact on tax collections of reduced wages and lowered economic activity
(see Johnson et al., 2010). The requirement that states have balanced budgets has increased the
pressure on states to deal with the unprecedented revenue shortfalls in a variety of ways; to recoup
lost revenue, states have taken actions such as increasing tax rates. For example, according to the
U.S. Census of Governments, the share of tax revenue in overall state revenue has increased from
38% to 42% between 2007 and 2012, on average across states.1 However, when it comes to the
policy details, which type of tax should be modied in each state to improve the state budget? What
are the implications for individual welfare and interstate migration? These questions can only be
answered by considering the economic behavior of all agents in all states such that the interaction
between alternative tax types can be investigated at the state level.
Accordingly, this paper introduces a general equilibrium regional trade model with an analytical
solution to investigate the e¤ects of tax changes at the regional level. The model has been designed
to consider alternative types of tax (wage-income, dividend-income, property, and sales taxes). As
in Roos (2004), individuals get utility out of consumption goods and housing as well as public goods
produced by the local government; the former two are purchased using wage income and dividend
income, while the latter is nanced by the taxes collected from individuals. The consideration of
public goods in the individual utility is important, because as shown by Partridge and Rickman
(1998), equalization of real wage rates that omits the consumption of regional amenities would not
be enough to examine the policies to increase quality of life such as improved schools or recreation-
1The story is very similar to the slowdown of the U.S. economy in 2001 when many states raised taxes to balance
their budgets; see Orszag and Stiglitz (2001).
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related public infrastructure. In addition to Roos (2004), we have disutility of supplying labor in
the utility function.
In the model, private rms produce consumption goods that are traded across regions. Although
the only factor of production is labor as in Roos (2004) who considers individual migration as
the only variable connecting any two regions with each other, this paper deviates by considering
interregional trade on top of individual migration. As advocated by Partridge and Rickman (2010),
this is important to capture the degree of openness of regional economies which are critical for
regional economic development analysis. Moreover, as shown by McGregor et al. (1999), the
predicted distribution of impacts depends on the interregional interactions that are essential for a
cross-state analysis as in this paper.
Public good is produced by the local government by using labor only. The amount of the
public good produced depends on the taxes collected as in Roos (2004) who considers public goods
nanced by taxes on housing only; this paper deviates by considering taxes collected by other
types of tax (wage-income, dividend-income, and sales taxes) as well. Such a strategy is essential
for answering one of the main questions in this paper regarding the type of tax that should be
modied in each state to improve the state budget.
In equilibrium, the consumption, labor and housing markets clear, while the nontraded public
good in each region is shared among individuals of that region. Although individuals migrate in
the long-run until individual welfare is equalized across regions, population in each region is xed
in the short-run; these two extreme cases practically cover the overall range for possible degrees of
labor mobility across regions, consistent with the evidence (in the existing literature) that original
residents benet from reduced unemployment due to migrating individuals.2
The model is shown to explain the state-level data from the U.S. which are also used to estimate
the parameters of the model that are necessary for the policy analysis.3 The corresponding policy
2See Bartik (1991,1994) and Partridge and Rickman (1999).
3Such an empirical strategy is consistent with studies such as by McKitrick (1998) who argues that econometric
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investigation at the state level suggests that increases in wage-income, property or sales taxes
would result in an increase in the state tax revenue in any state, while dividend-income taxes are
harmful for any state budget. The latter result is consistent with inuential studies such as by
Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) or Atkeson et al. (1999), together with their followers, who have
shown the optimality of a zero capital-income tax; however, it contradicts the conventional view
in the public nance literature that capital income should be taxed heavily. The main reason
behind this dilemma is that the conventional view in the public nance literature implies that
capital income taxes do not distort economic decisions (since the portion of income consumed is
xed); however, in this paper, together with earlier studies by studies such as by Judd (1985),
Chamley (1986) and Atkeson et al. (1999), dividend-income tax does distort economic decisions.
The distortion in this paper is achieved by dividend-income changes that a¤ect consumption and
labor-supply decisions of individuals through the overall protability of production rms that are
imperfectly competitive, where such prots are further shared among individuals.
There is also evidence for heterogeneity across states regarding their elasticity of tax revenue
with respect to state-level taxes. The model implies that a TaxIndex, which is a weighted average
of initial taxes (of wage-income, dividend-income, property, and sales) at the state level, where
weights are determined according to the individual preferences given in their utility functions, is an
important determinant of this heterogeneity. In particular, states with a lower TaxIndex would
benet more from an increase in their wage-income, property or sales taxes, while the harmful
e¤ects of dividend-income taxes would be higher for states with a higher TaxIndex.
Although individual welfare is equalized across states in the long-run (consistent with Gyourko
and Tracy, 1989; Dalenberg and Partridge, 1997), state-level tax increases can still be harmful
for individual welfare in the short-run, except for the increases in property taxes. In particular,
the most harmful tax type for individual welfare in the short-run is the state-level wage-income
tax followed by sales and dividend-income taxes. There is also evidence for heterogeneity across
estimation of general equilibrium models is superior.
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states regarding the elasticity of individual welfare with respect to state-level taxes in the short-
run. Once again, TaxIndex is shown to be the main determinant of this heterogeneity, where
individual welfare in states with a higher TaxIndex would su¤er more from an increase in state-
level wage-income, dividend-income or sales taxes, but they would benet less out of an increase
in property taxes in states.
An important state-level policy implication is that property tax is the only tax type of which
increase would boost both state tax revenue and short-run individual welfare in any state. This
is due to individuals who have to supply more labor due to higher property taxes resulting in
lower wages and thus higher levels of production and income at the state level, which means
higher state-level tax revenues and abundance of public goods. In contrast, an increase in state-
level wage-income or sales tax would result in higher state tax revenue in the cost of individual
welfare. The worst alternative is to increase state-level dividend-income taxes that would result
in a reduction in both state tax revenue and individual welfare for any state. The latter is due
to individuals consuming less and supplying more labor after the increase in dividend-income
taxes that result in higher wages together with lower production/income and thus lower state tax
revenue and lower public goods. For any type of tax, these e¤ects are shown to be magnied by
the TaxIndex across states.
This paper is connected to the literature investigating the e¤ects of regional taxes on tax
revenue, individual welfare and interregional migration, where the way that states use their tax
revenues becomes important. For instance, Dalenberg et al. (1998) have found that U.S. states have
beneted from taxes used to nance increased public infrastructure investment. In a related study,
Dalenberg and Partridge (1997) have shown how individuals respond to such changes in public
infrastructure investment by deciding on their location. Accordingly, this paper has considered
such details under the title of public goods that are produced subject to state-specic technologies
which play an important role in the welfare of individuals and thus their location decision. In this
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context, Seung and Kraybill (2001) and Conrad and Heng (2002) have shown that negative e¤ects
of increased taxes can be o¤set by better public infrastructure. It is implied that, for individuals,
there is a trade-o¤between increasing taxes and increasing public goods. This paper has considered
such linkages by including public goods in the utility function of individuals that are nanced by
the taxes in their budget constraint.
Regarding individual welfare and interregional migration, Cebula (1979) and Charney (1993)
show that many scal characteristics play important roles; these include tax and expenditure
policies of governments that may change income and the subsequent consumption of individuals.
However, most studies are not able to capture the possibility that some individuals are attracted
to higher tax burdens if the ensuing government spending is benecial to them, while others are
repelled by the higher tax burden as described in the subnational redistribution literature; one
exception is by Knapp et al. (2001) who nd that higher state tax liabilities encourage people
to stay in their states. This paper contributes by showing that the property tax is the only tax
type of which increase would encourage people to stay in the long-run, while increases in other tax
types would encourage people to leave. It is implied that the tax structure determined by the tax
portfolio is an important factor in each state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the economic en-
vironment that is essential for the state-level policy analysis in Section 3. Section 4 concludes
by providing policy suggestions/evaluations, while the Online Appendix provides all the technical
details of the policy analysis, including the analytical solution and empirical tests of the model.
2. The Economic Environment
The U.S. economy consisting of fty states and the District of Columbia (totally 51 regions) is
modeled. The static model consists of a nite number of regions, nite number of individuals in
each region, a private rm in each region, a local government producing the public good in each
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region, region-specic (wage-income, dividend-income, property, sales) taxes, trade of goods across
regions, and migrating individuals.
The modeling strategy that we follow is not arbitrary, and it is partly to capture the eco-
nomic interaction in the U.S. economy (e.g., interregional trade in consumption goods), partly to
investigate dividend-income taxes (e.g., prots through monopolistically-competitive rms), and
partly to obtain an analytical solution that considers migration (e.g., nite numbers of regions
and individuals). The private rm in each region is perfectly specialized in the production of a
good/commodity so that it has a market power to set its price with a markup over its marginal
cost where the markup is a function of the elasticity of substitution across private-sector goods.
The local government in each region produces a unique public good until total costs are equalized
to total taxes collected in that region. The total amount of the public good in each region is
equally shared/consumed among the individuals in that region; the public good is nontradable.
Both private and public sectors in each state have constant returns to scale production technolo-
gies that use labor as the only factor of production and are subject to region-specic technology
levels. Individuals have utilities from nal goods of the private sector coming from all regions, the
public good in their region, and the housing/property that they live at; they have disutility from
supplying labor to the local private and public sectors. The regional taxes come into the picture
in the budget constraint of the individuals. There is a local labor market in each region where
the total labor demand coming from private and public sectors are matched with the labor supply
coming from the individuals. The total prot of monopolistically-competitive private sector in all
regions is equally shared among all individuals in all regions. Because each private rm (in each
region) supplies its traded good to individuals in all regions, there are economic interactions across
all regions.
The analysis is made for a typical region r which is specialized in the manufacturing of a unique
good r. An individual is denoted by h, and total number of individuals in region r is Hr.
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2.1. Individuals
A typical individual h in region r maximizes:
Ur (h)  C log
 
CCr (h)

+ L log
 
CLr (h)

+ P log
 
CPr (h)
  N log (Nr (h)) (2.1)
where CCr (h) is a per capita composite index of consumption goods, C
L
r (h) is per capita housing,
CPr (h) is per capita public good in region r, and Nr (h) is per capita hours of labor supplied.
4 The
composite index of consumption goods in region r is further dened as:
CCr (h) =
 X
i
(r)
1

 
CCr;i (h)
  1

! 
 1
where CCr;i (h) is per capita consumption in region r of good i (produced in region i). Besides labor
income, each individual also receives   (h) as dividend income due to her share of positive prots
coming from the private-sector production and nationwide house ownership;   (h) independent
of the location of residence. In this context, the individual in region r maximizes Equation 2.1
subject to the following budget constraint:
PCr C
C
r (h)
 
1 + tCr

+ PLr C
L
r (h)
 
1 + tLr
  WrNr (h)  1  tWr +   (h)  1  tDr  (2.2)
where PCr is the price of the composite-consumption good, t
C
r is the sales tax rate, P
L
r is the price
of housing, tLr is the tax rate on housing (i.e., property tax), Wr is hourly nominal wage, t
W
r is the
wage-income tax rate, and tDr is the dividend-income tax rate in region r.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure yields the following demand function for im-
ports of region r from region i:
CCr;i (h) = r
 
PCr;i
PCr
! 
CCr (h)
where PCr 
P
i r
 
PCr;i
1  11 
is the cost-of-living index in region r.5
4The utility shares add up to one: C + L + P + N = 1. The corresponding analysis should be perceived as
for the average individual in any state, since we do not have any individual heterogeneity.
5It follows from the equations above that
P
i P
C
r;iCr;i (h) = P
C
r C
C
r (h).
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The individual maximizes utility by choosing CCr (h), C
L
r (h), and Nr (h); the amount of public
good is determined by the public sector. Therefore, the optimality condition for the individual is
given by:
PCr C
C
r (h)
 
1 + tCr

C
=
PLr C
L
r (h)
 
1 + tLr

L
=
WrNr (h)
 
1  tWr

N
(2.3)
where taxes play an important role.
2.2. Production/Endowment
There are two types of production in this economy: (i) consumption-good production by the private
sector, (ii) public-good production by the public sector.
2.2.1. Private-Sector Production
The monopolistically-competitive private-sector production rm in region r produces good r by
using local labor. The production is achieved according to the following constant returns to scale
function:
Y Cr = A
C
r L
C
r (2.4)
where ACr represents good- and region-specic production technology and L
C
r represents labor. To
avoid any double taxation, the production rm does not pay any taxes (because individuals pay
dividend taxes instead).
The cost minimization problem results in the following marginal cost of producing consumption
good r (in region r):
MCCr =
Wr
ACr
(2.5)
which is region specic. Market clearing for goods produced in region r is given by:
Y Cr =
X
i
HiC
C
i;r (h) =
X
i
Hii
 
PCi;r
PCi
! 
CCi (h)
which implies the following factory-gate price according to prot maximization:
PCr;r =

   1MC
C
r
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where the destination price in region i given by PCi;r is connected to the factory-gate price in region
r given by PCr;r according to P
C
i;r = P
C
r;r i, where  i represents destination-specic distribution costs
(e.g., retailing costs); gross markups are represented by 
 1 in this expression. In order to close
the model, the total prot of the private-sector production in all regions are equally shared among
individuals in all regions (as a part of   (h)).
2.2.2. Public-Sector Production
The local government in region r collects the following amount of tax revenue Tr:
Tr = Hr
 
tLr P
L
r C
L
r (h) + t
C
r P
C
r C
C
r (h) + t
W
r WNr (h) + t
D
r   (h)

(2.6)
where Hr represents the population. The tax revenue is further used to produce the unique public
good by using labor according to the following function in region r:
Y Pr = A
P
r L
P
r (2.7)
where APr represents good- and region-specic public-good-production technology and L
P
r is labor.
The cost minimization problem results in the following marginal cost of public good:
MCPr =
Wr
APr
(2.8)
The local government produces the public good as long as it can cover the total costs; therefore,
the total costs of local public good is equal to the tax revenue according to:
Tr =
Y Pr Wr
APr
2.2.3. Housing
Each region r is endowed with an available housing of Y Lr consumed by the individuals in that
region:
Y Lr = C
L
r (h)Hr
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where CLr (h) is per capita housing in region r (as above). In order to close the model, the housing
revenue coming from all regions is equally shared among individuals in all regions (as a part of
  (h)).
2.3. Analytical Solution
In equilibrium, regional labor markets clear, and regional wage rates (Wrs) are obtained as a
function of regional tax rates and technology levels. Using wage rates, per capita consumption
of goods, housing, public goods and labor supply are determined; accordingly, region-specic tax
revenues and individual utility/welfare are calculated. In the short-run, individuals cannot migrate,
so population is xed in each region. In the long-run, consistent with studies such as by Feldstein
and Wrobel (1998) who show that there are no redistributive e¤ects of state taxes, individuals
migrate to equalize the individual utility across regions; population of each region (Hrs) adjusts
accordingly where the utility shares in Equation 2.1 play an important role. All the technical
details of this analytical solution is provided in the Online Appendix.
2.4. Empirical Power of the Model
The implications of the model are tested for (i) the relation between total revenue and total costs
of the private sector; (ii) the ratio of population across U.S. states; (iii) the ratio of tax revenue
across U.S. states; and (iv) interstate trade between U.S. states. For these empirical tests, state-
level data (depicted in Appendix Table A1) from the U.S. are employed for total revenue and total
costs of the manufacturing sector, population, housing, taxes, tax revenues, wages, and interstate
trade. It is found that the model is consistent with the state-level data from the U.S.. Moreover,
the empirical investigation results in the parameter estimates that are necessary for the policy
analysis, below. All the technical details of these empirical tests, together with the data sources,
are provided in the Online Appendix; we focus on the economic intuition in the main text, below.
11
3. State-Level Policy Analysis
Given the tax rates, the state-level policy analysis consists of investigating the e¤ects of changes in
state-level wage-income taxes, property taxes, sales taxes and dividend-income taxes on individual
welfare and state tax revenue. We achieve this by focusing on each state individually; i.e., we
change the tax rate of a particular state and analyze what happens to the welfare of individuals
and the tax revenue in that state. In more technical terms, we are interested in the state-level
elasticities of individual welfare and tax revenue with respect to the state-level tax rates, by taking
into account the implications of our model. We achieve this by keeping technology levels of ACr s
and APr s, parameters ( r, and r) and the available housing of each region (given by Y
L
i s) the
same. All other technical details of the welfare analysis are given in the Online Appendix.
We measure the individual welfare by the exponential of the utility function given in Equation
2.1. In order to understand why individual welfare is a¤ected by changes in tax rates, we also
investigate what happens to the components of the individual utility function, namely per capita
consumption good, per capita housing, per capita public good, and per capita hours of work.
We distinguish between the short-run and long-run e¤ects of tax rate changes, where short-run is
dened as the case in which individual migration is not allowed across states, while long-run is
dened as the case in which individuals can migrate across states in order to equalize individual
utility across states.
It is important to emphasize that some states may have a initial state-level tax rate of zero
for some tax types (e.g., state income tax or state property tax), although the federal income
tax rates or country/township property tax rates are still positive. Nevertheless, the e¤ects of an
income tax change on individuals at the state level depend on how much total tax is initially paid
by the individuals in that state, either at the federal, state, or county level; this is exactly how
individuals decide what to do in case of a change in any tax rate. Therefore, the results below
should be interpreted as the implementation of a state-level tax change in states with either zero
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or non-zero initial state-level tax rate (for any type of tax). The data for such initial state-level
tax rates are constructed and discussed in details in the Online Appendix.6
3.1. E¤ects of Wage-Income Taxes
What happens to the individual welfare and population of a state if that state increases its wage-
income tax? In the short-run, the answer to this question is given in Table 1a, where we depict the
elasticity of state tax revenue, individual utility (and its components) and population with respect
to the state-level wage-income tax. As is evident, state tax revenue increases with wage-income
tax for any state with an average elasticity of 0.88. According to the model, for each state, the
most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run is as follows. After an increase in wage-income taxes,
individuals supply more labor in order to compensate for lower after-tax wages. This results in
higher employment in equilibrium with lower wages, because migration is not possible across states
in the short-run. Since the increase in hours of work is higher than the reduction in wages, the
state tax revenue increases.
When we make a comparison across states, Louisiana, Hawaii and Alabama would benet most
in terms of their tax revenue out of a wage-income tax increase, while states of Iowa, South Dakota,
New Hampshire and Texas would benet less. When we search for a systematic explanation for this
result, the model implies that the following TaxIndex is the main determinant of the di¤erence
across regions:
TaxIndexr =
CtCr
N (1 + tCr )
+
LtLr
N (1 + tLr )
+
tWr
1  tWr
+
 
C + L   N tDr
1  tDr
which is a weighted average of initial taxes at the state level (for which the data are described in
the Online Appendix) where weights are determined by the individual utility shares of C , L and
6Moreover, since we investigate each state individually ( i.e., we change the tax rate of a particular state and
analyze what happens to the welfare of individuals and the tax revenue in that state), if there are certain states
where some tax types are not politically feasible, that would not a¤ect the results based on other states.
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N (which have been estimated using state-level data from the U.S. in the Online Appendix).7 In
particular, the relation between TaxIndex and the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the
wage-income tax is given in the upper left panel of Figure 1 in the short-run. As is evident, the
states that have beneted more in relative terms are the ones with a lower TaxIndex.
As is also evident in Table 1a, for any state, increasing the wage-income tax results in an
individual welfare loss of around 0:18% (on average across states) after a 1% increase of wage-
income tax in the short-run. When we investigate the reasons behind this average result at the
individual level, it is due to the increase in hours of work, because the increase in public goods is
not enough to cover the disutility due to working more. The heterogeneity across states, though, is
again due to the TaxIndex as depicted in the upper left panel of Figure 2. Specically, individuals
in states with a higher TaxIndex would su¤er more from an increase in wage-income tax in the
short-run.
When we remove the restriction on migration in the long-run, individuals move across regions
to equalize their welfare due to changes in taxes; on average (across states), about 0.28% of the
state population moves to other states after a 1% increase in wage-income tax. In such a case, we
obtain the long-run elasticities given in Table 1b, where the average (across states) elasticity of
state tax revenue is about 0.60. This elasticity is lower than the short-run version of it, because
some individuals would leave the states with higher wage-income taxes. According to the model,
for each state, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the long-run is very similar to the one in the
short-run; the main di¤erence is that the population is lower in the long-run which results in lower
tax revenue. When we search for a systematic explanation for the heterogeneity across states in
the upper right panel of Figure 3, we again observe that the states that have beneted more in
relative terms are the ones with a lower TaxIndex.
7TaxIndex for each state is given in Table A1. The estimation results show that housing takes the highest share
in individual utility with L = 0:64, followed by the disutility due to supplying labor with N = 0:14, consumption
with C = 0:12, and public goods with P = 0:10. See the Online Appendix for further details.
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3.2. E¤ects of Sales Taxes
The short-run e¤ects of an increase in sales taxes in a particular state are given in Table 2a where
the average (across states) elasticity of tax revenue with respect to sales taxes is about 0.20. As is
evident, the tax revenue of any state would increase after an increase in its sales tax rate. According
to the model, for each state, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run is as follows. The
increase in sales taxes increases the price of the consumption good for individuals who would like to
work more for compensation. Since the corresponding increase in the wage income is higher than
the increase in the tax-related cost of consumption, each individual ends up with paying higher
sales taxes, which results in higher tax revenue for each state.
In the long-run, the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to sales taxes is lower for each state
as depicted in Table 2b. The reason behind this is the migration of individuals (with an elasticity
of about  0:15 on average) to other states due to higher sales taxes. Hence, although the chain of
logic according to the model is very similar, the only di¤erence in the long-run is having a lower
increase in the state tax revenue due to fewer individuals paying sales taxes.
Both in the short-run and the long-run, as shown in the upper right part of Figures 1 and 3,
the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to sales taxes goes down with the TaxIndex. Therefore,
states with low TaxIndex such as Louisiana, Hawaii and Alabama would benet most from an
increase in sales taxes, while New Jersey, Wisconsin, Vermont and Nebraska would not have any
signicant changes in their tax revenues.
Although the individual welfare is equalized in the long-run through migration, it is a¤ected
negatively by an increase in sales taxes in the short-run. The average (across states) elasticity of
welfare in such a case is about  0:10 as shown in Table 2a, which is, as expected, mostly due to
the reduction in consumption and the increase in hours of work, where the increase in per capita
public good is not enough for compensation. According to Figure 2, once again, TaxIndex is an
important determinant of the heterogeneity across states, where individuals in states with a higher
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TaxIndex would su¤er more from an increase in state-level sales taxes in the short-run.
3.3. E¤ects of Property Taxes
An increase in state-level property taxes would also increase tax revenue of any state, both in the
short-run and long-run, as depicted in Tables 3a and 3b. According to the model, for each state,
the most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run is as follows. Especially in the short-run, since
individuals cannot migrate across states, they would work more in order to compensate for higher
taxes, which would result in lower wage rates and thus higher levels of production and higher
income. Accordingly, although other tax rates remain the same, due to an increase in property
taxes, the overall state tax revenue would increase. According to the lower left panels of Figures
1 and 3, once again, the TaxIndex seems to be the main determinant of tax revenue di¤erences
across states.
One interesting result is related to the e¤ect of property tax on individual welfare in the short-
run. As is evident in Table 3a, in any state, individual welfare would increase after an increase
in property taxes in the short-run. This is mostly due to higher per capita public good produced
by lower wages, which even compensates for higher disutility due to supplies higher hours of
labor. This result is consistent with studies such as by Seung and Kraybill (2001) and Conrad and
Heng (2002) mentioned above. The heterogeneity across states is again related to the TaxIndex
according to the lower left panel of Figure 2. Therefore, both state tax revenue and short-run
individual welfare would benet from an increase in state-level property taxes.8
8Compared to Table 1a, which shows the e¤ects of an increase in the wage-income tax on individual welfare,
the economic implications in Table 3a (showing the e¤ects of an increase in the property tax) are very similar:
higher hours of work, lower wages, and higher public goods. However, only in the case of increased property taxes,
the increase in public goods is high enough to compensate for the disutility out of supplying labor. This result
is mostly due to the individual optimality conditions where the share of housing L has a much higher estimated
value compared to disutility coe¢ cient N due to supplying labor.
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3.4. E¤ects of Dividend-Income Taxes
Dividend-income tax is the only tax type that results in lower state tax revenue, in both short-run
(with an average elasticity of  1:29) and long-run (with an average elasticity of  1:39), according
to Tables 4a and 4b. According to the model, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run
is as follows. Individuals would reduce both consumption and labor supply due to their utility
optimization after the increase in dividend-income taxes. This would result in higher wages in any
state which would a¤ect the overall production (and thus income) negatively. Accordingly, state
tax revenue would decline in any state. Nevertheless, the reduction in tax revenue would be much
lower for states with a lower TaxIndex according to the lower right panel of Figures 1 and 3.
The short-run e¤ects of an increase in dividend-income taxes would be negative on individual
welfare of any state according to Table 4a. The main reasons behind this result are the reduction
in per capita consumption and per capita public good; the reduction in hours of work is not enough
to compensate for the reductions in consumption and public good.
4. Concluding Remarks and Discussion
Regional taxes are important public-policy tools that have implications on the distribution of tax
revenue and individual welfare across regions. This paper has introduced a general equilibrium
model with an analytical solution to investigate the implications of regional taxes that individuals
pay by taking into account the interaction between regions through interregional trade. The
model is rich enough to consider alternative tax types through a private sector, a public sector,
and individual migration across regions. State-level evidence from the U.S. supports the model
through regression analyses with high explanatory powers.
Based on the parameters estimated using the U.S. state-level data, the policy analysis suggests
that any state in the U.S. would benet from an increase in wage-income tax, sales tax or property
tax in terms of tax revenue, while any increase in dividend-income tax would result in a reduction
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in tax revenue. Another result of the policy analysis is that tax revenues react di¤erently to changes
in tax rates across states. When we have further investigated the reasons behind this result, we
have shown that a TaxIndex, which is a weighted average of initial taxes at the state level, is an
important determinant to explain the di¤erences across states. Accordingly, one state-level policy
suggestion is that states with a low TaxIndex would increase their tax revenue by increasing their
wage-income, sales or property taxes, while states with already a high TaxIndex would have a
harder time increasing their tax revenues through the same tax raises.
Regarding the policy evaluation of the period after the Great Recession, although many states
have changed their income and sales taxes, only a few of them have increased their property
taxes (e.g., Hawaii and Rhode Island in 2010, or Connecticut, Illinois and Ohio in 2011).9 This
is interesting, because, according to the results in this paper, state property tax is the only tax
type of which increase would boost both state tax revenue and short-run individual welfare. It is
implied that the type of tax that will be used to increase state tax revenue mostly depends on the
objective function of the state governments. For example, in the extreme case of self-interested
states, wage-income tax is shown to be the best one to increase, because the elasticity of tax
revenue takes its highest value (on average across states) with respect to this tax type; this is
consistent with the observation for some states that have increased only their income taxes. In
the other extreme case of benevolent states, property tax is shown to be the best one to increase,
because both state tax revenue and short-run individual welfare are boosted by this tax type. Any
state government in between would increase the overall state tax portfolios, including sales taxes
(especially in the short-run), as it has been the case for many states after the Great Recession.
The results of this paper are not without any caveats. In particular, they should be evaluated
based on the model introduced in order to answer specic questions such as which type of tax
should be modied in each state to improve the state budget or what the implications are for
individual welfare and interstate migration. Accordingly, a specic modeling strategy has been
9Source: The web page of Tax Foundation at http://taxfoundation.org/.
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employed with the necessary ingredients such as interregional trade in consumption goods, prots
through monopolistically-competitive rms, or individual migration across regions. Although we
have considered cases of both migration (in the long-run) and no migration (in the short-run)
for robustness, we kept other necessary ingredients in the model in order to answer the questions
in hand. A richer modeling strategy would allow questioning the restrictions imposed by these
ingredients, potentially while answering alternative questions. We leave such details for future
research.
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5. Online Appendix
5.1. Analytical Solution of the Model
We start with the labor market equilibrium, so that we can obtain an expression for wages. The
per capita labor demand in region r is given by:
LCr + L
P
r
Hr
=
Y Cr
HrACr
+
Y Pr
HrAPr
while, according to the individual optimality, the labor supply is implied as:
Nr (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

Wr (1  tWr )
 
C + L   N
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Hence, in equilibrium:
Wr =
Hr  (h)
 
1  tDr

(1  tWr )
 
C + L   N Y Cr
ACr
+ Y
P
r
APr

Since Tr =
Y Pr Wr
APr
, wage rates are given by:
Wr =
Hr  (h)
 
1  tDr

(1  tWr )
 
C + L   N Y Cr
ACr
+ Tr
Wr
 (5.1)
where we can solve for Wr considering the implications of the model for
Y Cr
ACr
and Tr
Wr
.
We continue with the equilibrium of consumption goods. Accordingly, market clearing for
goods produced in region r is given by:
Y Cr =
X
i
HiC
C
i;r (h) =
X
i
Hii
 
PCi;r
PCi
! 
CCi (h)
which can be combined by PCi;r = P
C
r;r i, P
C
r;r =

 1MC
C
r , and MC
C
r =
Wr
ACr
to have:
Y Cr
ACr
=
1
ACr

   1

Wr
ACr
 X
i
Hii

 i
PCi
 
CCi (h)
Substituting this into the labor-market equilibrium condition in Equation 5.1 implies that:
Wr =
Hr  (h)
 
1  tDr

(1  tWr )
 
C + L   N Y Cr
ACr
+ Y
P
r
APr

Using the public-good clearing condition

i.e., Tr =
Y Pr Wr
APr

, together with the equilibrium condi-
tion for local housing

i.e., CLr (h) =
Y Lr f
L
r
Hr

and individual optimization conditions given by:
PCr C
C
r (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

C
(1 + tCr )
N
 
C + L   N
PLr C
L
r (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

L
(1 + tLr )
N
 
C + L   N
WrNr (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

(1  tWr )
 
C + L   N
the wage rate in region r is given by:
Wr = A
C
r
0B@
 
C + L   N2  1  tWr   1PiHii   iPCi   CCi (h)
Hr  (h) (1  tDr )
 
C + L   N   (1  tWr ) tAr

1CA
1
 1
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where
tAr = TaxIndexr =
tLr 
L
(1 + tLr )
N
+
tCr 
C
(1 + tCr )
N
+
tWr
1  tWr
+
tDr
 
C + L   N
1  tDr
(5.2)
is what we call "TaxIndexr" in the main text. The ratio of tax revenue across regions r and i is
implied as follows:
Tr
Ti
=
Hrt
A
r
 
1  tDr

HitAi (1  tDi )
(5.3)
The ratio of wages across regions r and i is implied as follows:
Wr
Wi
=
ACr
ACi
 
Hi
 
1  tWr
  
1  tDi
  
C + L   N    1  tWi  tAi 
Hr (1  tWi ) (1  tDr )
 
C + L   N   (1  tWr ) tAr
 ! 1 1 (5.4)
where the ratio of population across regions r and i given by Hr
Hi
is found by equalization of
individual utilities across regions through migration.
The equalization of individual utilities across regions r and i implies that:
expUr (h)
expUi (h)


CCr (h)
CCi (h)
C 
CLr (h)
CLi (h)
L 
CPr (h)
CPi (h)
P 
Ni (h)
Nr (h)
N
Since per capita housing is determined by the following market clearing condition:
CLr (h) =
Y Lr
Hr
and since per capita public good is given by:
CPr (h) =
Y Pr
Hr
=
TrA
P
r
HrWr
and since individual optimality conditions imply:
CCr (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

C
PCr (1 + t
C
r )
N
 
C + L   N
=
  (h)
 
1  tDr

CP
i r
 
 rPCi;i
1  11 
(1 + tCr )
N
 
C + L   N
CLr (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

L
PLr (1 + t
L
r )
N
 
C + L   N
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Nr (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

Wr (1  tWr )
 
C + L   N
the ratio of population across regions r and i is implied as:
Hr
Hi
 Y
L
r
Y Li

Wr
Wi
N P
L
  
1  tDr
  
1 + tCi

 i (i)
1
1 
(1  tDi ) (1 + tCr )  r (r)
1
1 
!C
L
(5.5)

 
APr
APi
 
1  tDr

tAr
(1  tDi ) tAi
!P
L
  
1  tDi
  
1  tWr

(1  tDr ) (1  tWi )
!N
L
Substituting this expression back into Equation 5.4 results in:
Wr
Wi
=
0BBBBBBBB@
Y Li
Y Lr

(1 tDi )(1+tCr )r(r)
1
1 
(1 tDr )(1+tCi ) i(i)
1
1 
C
L

APi
APr
(1 tDi )tAi
(1 tDr )tAr
P
L


ACr
ACi
 1(1 tDr )(1 tWi )
(1 tDi )(1 tWr )
N
L
 1
(C+L N (1 tWi )tAi )
(C+L N (1 tWr )tAr )
1CCCCCCCCA
L
( 1)L+N P
which can be used to nd the closed-form solution for all other endogenous variables in the model.
5.2. Welfare Analysis
By keeping technology levels of ACr s and A
P
r s, parameters ( r, and r) and the available housing of
each region (given by Y Li s) the same, we are interested in the e¤ects of a change in one particular
regions tax rate on that regions individual welfare given by the exponential of the individual
utility function. Accordingly, the elasticity of individual welfare with respect to region-specic tax
rates in region r relative to region i is given by:
"r;i = \expUr (h)  \expUi (h)
= C
\CCr (h)
CCi (h)

due to per capita consumption
+ L
\CLr (h)
CLi (h)

due to housing
+ P
\CPr (h)
CPi (h)

due to per capita public good
  N
\Nr (h)
Ni (h)

due to labor supply
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where c() represents percentage change within the whole parenthesis after 1% of an increase in tax
rates, and the components of this elasticity are given as follows:
\CCr (h)
CCi (h)

=
\(1  tDr )
(1  tDi )

+
\(1 + tCi )
(1 + tCr )

and
\CLr (h)
CLi (h)

=  
\Hr
Hi

and
\CPr (h)
CPi (h)

=
\Tr
Ti

 
\Hr
Hi

 
\Wr
Wi

and
\Nr (h)
Ni (h)

=
\(1  tDr ) (1  tWi )
(1  tDi ) (1  tWr )

 
\Wr
Wi

where the relative percentage change in wages is given by:
\Wr
Wi

=
0BBBBBBB@
C
( 1)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N P
\(1 tDi )(1+tCr )
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
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P
( 1)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N P
\(1 tDi )tAi
(1 tDr )tAr

+ 
N L
( 1)L+N P
\
(1 tDr )(1 tWi )
(1 tDi )(1 tWr )

+ 
L
( 1)L+N P
\
C+L N (1 tWi )tAi
C+L N (1 tWr )tAr

1CCCCCCCA
the relative percentage change in population levels is given by:
\Hr
Hi

=
0BBBBBBB@
N P
L
\Wr
Wi

+ 
C
L
\
(1 tDr )(1+tCi )
(1 tDi )(1+tCr )

+
P
L
\
(1 tDr )tAr
(1 tDi )tAi

+ 
N
L
\(1 tDi )(1 tWr )
(1 tDr )(1 tWi )

1CCCCCCCA
the relative percentage change in tax revenues is given by:
\Tr
Ti

=
\Hr
Hi

+
\1  tDr
1  tDi

+
\tAr
tAi

Note that technology levels of ACr s and A
P
r s, parameters ( r and r) and available housing in each
region (given by Y Li s) are e¤ectively cancelled out while calculating the log di¤erence between
before and after tax changes. As is evident, when data for tax rates are available, the only
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parameters that are necessary to calculate the elasticity of individual welfare with respect to
region-specic tax rates are , C ; L; P and N ; using data from the U.S., we estimate all of
these parameters, below. Once such parameters are available, thanks to the general-equilibrium
framework, for the counterfactual analysis, all one has to do is to include the changes in state-level
tax rates into the equations introduced in this subsection.
We distinguish between the short-run and long-run e¤ects of tax rate changes, where short-run
is dened as the case in which individual migration is not allowed across states (i.e., Hr is constant
for all r), while long-run is dened as the case in which individuals can migrate across states in
order to equalize individual utility across states (i.e., Hr is allowed to change for all r).
5.3. Testing Implications of the Model for the Elasticity of Substitution across Goods
The model implies that the total revenue of each private-sector producer is connected to the total
cost according to the following expression:
PCr;rY
C
r| {z }
Total Revenue
=


   1

| {z }
Gross Markup
MCCr Y
C
r| {z }
Total Cost
which can be estimated using manufacturing data obtained from Economic Census Data of the
U.S. Census Bureau for 2007 at the state level.
In particular, under the assumptions of CES utility functions and constant returns to scale, state
level production data for total costs and total revenues in the U.S. are used to determine/estimate
gross markups and thus the elasticity of substitution . The estimation results in  = 3:6 with a
standard error of 0.08 and an R-squared value of 0.97.
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5.4. Testing Implications of the Model for State-Level Population
The log version of Equation 5.5 can be estimated as follows:
log

Hr
Hi

| {z }
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 
L
L + P
log

Y Lr
Y Li

| {z }
Housing
+
C
L + P
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  
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
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!
| {z }
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+
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
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
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Revenue/Wage Interaction
+
N
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P
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 
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  
1  tWr

(1  tDr ) (1  tWi )
!
| {z }
Wage/Tax Interaction
+log
0B@  i (i) 11 
 r (r)
1
1 
! C
L+P

APr
APi
 P
L+P
1CA
| {z }
Residuals
where data for population Hr, housing (Y Lr ), and tax revenue (Tr) have been obtained from the
U.S. Census Bureau, while data for wages (Wr) have been obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, all for the year of 2007, except for housing which is for 2010.
The tax rates are obtained from Tax Foundation for the year of 2007. In order to take into
account the nationwide taxes in the data, for each state, any tax rate is calculated as the sum of
federal, social security, medicare, and state taxes, when relevant. For instance, the income taxes
that are indepedent of state income taxes add up to 0.40 for the year of 2007. Such values are added
on top of state income taxes in order to obtain the values given in Table A1. Since most taxes are
progressive (i.e., the tax rate increases as the taxable base amount increases), we use the national
average net compensation (of about $39K) published by the Social Security Administration for the
year 2007 as the taxable base amount.
The only exceptions are the state-level property tax rates which are calculated by using the
local tax paid for the median-value house in each state. The tax paid for the median-value house in
each state has been obtained by dividing the median property taxes paid on houses by the annual
mortgage payment of the median-value house on a 30-year loan where the mortgage rate has been
taken as 6.2% for the year 2007. As an example, consider the state of Alabama where the median
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property tax paid is $352 and the median house value is $115,600 for 2007. Using the mortgage
rate of 6.2%, we calculate the property tax rate for Alabama using the following formulation:
tLALABAMA =
352
115; 600 (0:062=12) (1+0:062=12)360
(1+0:062=12)360 1
= 0:50
As is evident by the tax rates in each state are given in Table A1, although wage-income,
dividend-income and sales taxes are somehow close to each other across states, the property taxes
are more dispersed. It is important to emphasize that some states may have a tax rate of zero
for some tax types (e.g., state income tax or state property tax). Nevertheless, the e¤ects of a
tax change on individiuals at the state level depend on how much total tax is initially paid by the
individuals in that state, either at the federal, state, or county level; this is exactly how individuals
decide what to do in case of a change in any tax rate.
Within this context, since the coe¢ cients in front of housing and revenue/wage interaction
add up to 1, we use restricted least squares as the estimation methodology. The results are given
in Table A2, where all coe¢ cients are positive and signicant as expected with an R-squared
value of 0.99. Combining these estimates with C + L + P + N = 1 results in the individual
estimates for C ; L; P and N in Table A2. As is evident, housing takes the highest share in
individual utility with L = 0:64, followed by the disutility due to supplying labor with N = 0:14,
consumption with C = 0:12, and public goods with P = 0:10. These estimates are used in the
welfare/counterfactual analyses.
5.5. Testing Implications of the Model for Tax Revenue
The log version of Equation 5.3 can be estimated as follows:
log

Tr
Ti

| {z }
Tax Revenue
= log
 
Hrt
A
r
 
1  tDr

HitAi (1  tDi )
!
| {z }
Population/Tax Interaction
where the data are the same as above except for tAr which has been calculated according to Equation
5.2 using the results in Table A2 for the parameters of C ; L and N .
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Since the coe¢ cient in front of the right hand side (i.e., population/tax interaction) is equal
to 1 according to the model, we use restricted least squares which results in an R-squared value
of 0.93 as shown in Table A3. When we take an unrestricted approach where the coe¢ cients in
front of the right hand side is allowed to be di¤erent from 1, the results are also given in Table A3,
where the coe¢ cient is statistically very close to 1 (i.e., 0.97). Therefore, the implications of the
model introduced in this paper are consistent with the available data on tax revenue, population
and tax rates across U.S. states.
5.6. Testing Implications of the Model for Interstate Trade
Consider the individual optimality conditions for region k regarding the consumption goods im-
ported from region i and region r:
CCk;i (h) = k
 
PCk;i
PCk
! 
CCk (h)
and
CCk;r (h) = k
 
PCk;r
PCk
! 
CCk (h)
where the notation is the same as in the main text. Accordingly, the ratio of imports of region k
from region i versus region r is given by:
PCk;iC
C
k;i (h)
PCk;rC
C
k;r (h)
=
 
PCi;i
PCr;r
!1 
where we have used PCk;i = P
C
i;i k. Using the denition of factory-gate prices

i.e., PCi;i =

 1MC
C
i

and marginal costs of production

i.e., MCCi =
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
, we can write:
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which can be rewritten in log form using Equation 5.4 as follows:
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Therefore, relative imports of a destination region from two source regions depends on the popu-
lation ratio and the tax ratio of the source regions. We test this implication of the model using
the log version of this equation. The bilateral trade data across the U.S. states are obtained from
Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics for the year of 2007.
To make the connection between CFS and the model, we use the overall value of shipments. Data
for taxes are the same as above, and the results in Table A2 are used for the parameters of C ; L
and N .
Since the coe¢ cient in front of population and tax are both equal to 1 according to the model,
we use restricted least squares which results in an R-squared value of 0.45 as shown in Table A4.
When we take an unrestricted approach where the coe¢ cients in front of population and tax are
allowed to be di¤erent from 1, the results are also given in Table A4, where the coe¢ cient in front
of taxes is statistically not di¤erent from 1, while the coe¢ cient in front of population is very close
to 1 (i.e., 1.17). Therefore, in addition to the existing literature on gravity studies where variables
such as population are standard, taxes enter the trade regressions positively and signicantly,
which shows that the implications of the model introduced in this paper are consistent with the
available data on trade and taxes across U.S. states.
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Figure 1 - Short-run Effects of State-Level Taxes on State-Level Tax Revenue 
 
Notes: The short-run is defined as the case where individuals are not allowed to migrate. The fitted curves and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals have 
been calculated using a quadratic regression between the elasticity of tax revenue and the TaxIndex given by  𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
2. TaxIndex has been normalized such that the state of California has a value of 1. 
Figure 2 - Short-run Effects of State-Level Taxes on Individual Welfare 
 
Notes: The short-run is defined as the case where individuals are not allowed to migrate. The fitted curves and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals have 
been calculated using a quadratic regression between the elasticity of individual welfare and the TaxIndex given by  𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 =  𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
2. TaxIndex has been normalized such that the state of California has a value of 1. 
Figure 3 - Long-run Effects of State-Level Taxes on State-Level Tax Revenue 
 
Notes: The long-run is defined as the case where individuals are allowed to migrate. The fitted curves and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals have been 
calculated using a quadratic regression between the elasticity of tax revenue and the TaxIndex given by 
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
2. TaxIndex has been normalized such that the state of California has a value of 1. 
Table 1a - Short-run Elasticities with respect to Wage-Income Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama 1.08 -0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.28 -0.15
Alaska 0.72 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.26 -0.18
Arizona 0.95 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.29 -0.17
Arkansas 1.04 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.31 -0.18
California 1.06 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.31 -0.19
Colorado 0.95 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.29 -0.18
Connecticut 0.75 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.28 -0.20
Delaware 1.08 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.30 -0.17
Washington DC 1.12 -0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.31 -0.18
Florida 0.77 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.26 -0.17
Georgia 0.90 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.29 -0.19
Hawaii 1.37 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.33 -0.16
Idaho 0.97 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.31 -0.19
Illinois 0.70 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.27 -0.19
Indiana 0.79 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.28 -0.19
Iowa 0.69 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.26 -0.18
Kansas 0.80 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29 -0.20
Kentucky 0.92 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.29 -0.19
Louisiana 1.43 -0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.30 -0.12
Maine 0.88 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.31 -0.20
Maryland 0.89 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.29 -0.18
Massachusetts 0.81 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29 -0.19
Michigan 0.73 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.28 -0.19
Minnesota 0.87 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 -0.20
Mississippi 1.01 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.29 -0.18
Missouri 0.76 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.26 -0.17
Montana 0.78 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.26 -0.17
Nebraska 0.75 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29 -0.21
Nevada 0.88 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.27 -0.16
New Hampshire 0.63 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.26 -0.18
New Jersey 0.70 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.27 -0.19
New Mexico 0.99 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.29 -0.18
New York 0.83 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 -0.20
North Carolina 0.92 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.30 -0.19
North Dakota 0.73 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.28 -0.19
Ohio 0.75 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.28 -0.19
Oklahoma 0.92 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.30 -0.19
Oregon 0.96 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.31 -0.20
Pennsylvania 0.72 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.27 -0.19
Rhode Island 0.82 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 -0.20
South Carolina 1.00 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.30 -0.19
South Dakota 0.68 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.26 -0.18
Tennessee 0.78 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.26 -0.17
Texas 0.63 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.26 -0.18
Utah 1.00 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.30 -0.19
Vermont 0.78 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.30 -0.21
Virginia 0.93 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.29 -0.19
Washington 0.76 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.26 -0.17
West Virginia 1.01 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.29 -0.17
Wisconsin 0.75 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29 -0.20
Wyoming 0.90 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.27 -0.16
Average 0.88 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.29 -0.18
SHORT-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing, Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax 
Revenue and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the wage-income tax of the corresponding state.  
Table 1b - Long-run Elasticities with respect to Wage-Income Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama 0.86 -0.18 -0.22 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.00
Alaska 0.45 -0.04 -0.27 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.00
Arizona 0.69 -0.11 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.27 0.00
Arkansas 0.76 -0.12 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.00
California 0.77 -0.12 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.30 0.00
Colorado 0.68 -0.10 -0.27 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.27 0.00
Connecticut 0.45 -0.03 -0.30 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.27 0.00
Delaware 0.82 -0.15 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.12 0.29 0.00
Washington DC 0.85 -0.15 -0.27 0.00 0.17 0.12 0.29 0.00
Florida 0.51 -0.06 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.00
Georgia 0.61 -0.08 -0.29 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.28 0.00
Hawaii 1.13 -0.26 -0.24 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.31 0.00
Idaho 0.67 -0.09 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.29 0.00
Illinois 0.41 -0.02 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.00
Indiana 0.51 -0.05 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.08 0.26 0.00
Iowa 0.41 -0.03 -0.27 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.24 0.00
Kansas 0.50 -0.04 -0.30 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.28 0.00
Kentucky 0.63 -0.08 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.28 0.00
Louisiana 1.24 -0.37 -0.19 0.00 0.12 0.17 0.29 0.00
Maine 0.57 -0.06 -0.31 0.00 0.20 0.09 0.29 0.00
Maryland 0.61 -0.08 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.27 0.00
Massachusetts 0.51 -0.05 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.27 0.00
Michigan 0.44 -0.03 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.00
Minnesota 0.58 -0.06 -0.30 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.28 0.00
Mississippi 0.74 -0.12 -0.27 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.28 0.00
Missouri 0.49 -0.05 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.00
Montana 0.51 -0.06 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.00
Nebraska 0.44 -0.03 -0.31 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.00
Nevada 0.63 -0.09 -0.25 0.00 0.16 0.09 0.25 0.00
New Hampshire 0.35 -0.01 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.00
New Jersey 0.41 -0.02 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.00
New Mexico 0.72 -0.11 -0.27 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.28 0.00
New York 0.53 -0.05 -0.30 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.28 0.00
North Carolina 0.63 -0.08 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.28 0.00
North Dakota 0.44 -0.03 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.00
Ohio 0.45 -0.03 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.26 0.00
Oklahoma 0.63 -0.08 -0.29 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.28 0.00
Oregon 0.65 -0.08 -0.30 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.30 0.00
Pennsylvania 0.43 -0.03 -0.29 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.00
Rhode Island 0.52 -0.05 -0.30 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.00
South Carolina 0.71 -0.11 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.00
South Dakota 0.41 -0.03 -0.27 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.24 0.00
Tennessee 0.52 -0.06 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.00
Texas 0.35 -0.01 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.00
Utah 0.71 -0.11 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.00
Vermont 0.47 -0.03 -0.31 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.00
Virginia 0.65 -0.09 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.28 0.00
Washington 0.50 -0.05 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.00
West Virginia 0.74 -0.12 -0.26 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.28 0.00
Wisconsin 0.44 -0.03 -0.31 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.27 0.00
Wyoming 0.65 -0.10 -0.25 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.25 0.00
Average 0.60 -0.08 -0.28 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.27 0.00
LONG-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing, Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax 
Revenue and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the wage-income tax of the corresponding state.  
Table 2a - Short-run Elasticities with respect to Sales Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama 0.30 -0.19 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.10
Alaska 0.21 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.11
Arizona 0.22 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Arkansas 0.21 -0.12 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
California 0.21 -0.12 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Colorado 0.23 -0.13 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Connecticut 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Delaware 0.26 -0.16 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.10
Washington DC 0.23 -0.14 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.10
Florida 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Georgia 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Hawaii 0.28 -0.19 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.10
Idaho 0.19 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Illinois 0.17 -0.08 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Indiana 0.19 -0.10 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Iowa 0.18 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Kansas 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Kentucky 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Louisiana 0.39 -0.32 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.09
Maine 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Maryland 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Massachusetts 0.18 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Michigan 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Minnesota 0.18 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Mississippi 0.22 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Missouri 0.21 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Montana 0.23 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Nebraska 0.16 -0.08 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Nevada 0.23 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
New Hampshire 0.19 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.11
New Jersey 0.16 -0.08 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
New Mexico 0.22 -0.13 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
New York 0.18 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
North Carolina 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
North Dakota 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Ohio 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Oklahoma 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Oregon 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.11
Pennsylvania 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Rhode Island 0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
South Carolina 0.21 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
South Dakota 0.19 -0.10 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.10
Tennessee 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Texas 0.17 -0.08 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Utah 0.21 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Vermont 0.16 -0.08 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Virginia 0.21 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Washington 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
West Virginia 0.23 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
Wisconsin 0.16 -0.08 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.10
Wyoming 0.25 -0.14 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.10
Average 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.10
SHORT-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing , Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax 
Revenue and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the sales tax of the corresponding state.  
Table 2b - Long-run Elasticities with respect to Sales Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama 0.15 -0.13 -0.15 -0.12 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00
Alaska 0.05 -0.05 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Arizona 0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Arkansas 0.06 -0.07 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
California 0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Colorado 0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Connecticut 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Delaware 0.11 -0.10 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.00
Washington DC 0.08 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Florida 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Georgia 0.04 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Hawaii 0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00
Idaho 0.04 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Illinois 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Indiana 0.03 -0.04 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Iowa 0.03 -0.04 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Kansas 0.01 -0.03 -0.16 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Kentucky 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Louisiana 0.25 -0.26 -0.14 -0.12 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.00
Maine 0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Maryland 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Massachusetts 0.03 -0.04 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Michigan 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Minnesota 0.02 -0.04 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Mississippi 0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.11 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00
Missouri 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Montana 0.07 -0.06 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Nebraska 0.00 -0.02 -0.16 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Nevada 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 -0.11 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00
New Hampshire 0.03 -0.03 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
New Jersey 0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
New Mexico 0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
New York 0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
North Carolina 0.04 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
North Dakota 0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Ohio 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Oklahoma 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Oregon 0.04 -0.05 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Pennsylvania 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Rhode Island 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
South Carolina 0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
South Dakota 0.03 -0.04 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Tennessee 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Texas 0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Utah 0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Vermont 0.00 -0.02 -0.16 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Virginia 0.05 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Washington 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
West Virginia 0.08 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Wisconsin 0.00 -0.02 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
Wyoming 0.10 -0.08 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
Average 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
LONG-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing , Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax 
Revenue and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the sales tax of the corresponding state.  
Table 3a - Short-run Elasticities with respect to Property Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama 0.76 -0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.05
Alaska 0.15 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Arizona 0.39 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
Arkansas 0.39 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
California 0.37 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
Colorado 0.33 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02
Connecticut 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Delaware 0.49 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.03
Washington DC 0.50 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.03
Florida 0.23 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02
Georgia 0.23 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02
Hawaii 0.87 -0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.06
Idaho 0.26 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Illinois 0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Indiana 0.17 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Iowa 0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Kansas 0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Kentucky 0.26 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Louisiana 1.46 -1.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.17 0.09
Maine 0.14 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Maryland 0.26 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Massachusetts 0.17 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
Michigan 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Minnesota 0.17 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
Mississippi 0.42 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
Missouri 0.21 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02
Montana 0.22 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02
Nebraska 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Nevada 0.40 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
New Hampshire 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
New Jersey 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
New Mexico 0.38 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
New York 0.13 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
North Carolina 0.23 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02
North Dakota 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Ohio 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Oklahoma 0.25 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Oregon 0.20 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Pennsylvania 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Rhode Island 0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
South Carolina 0.33 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02
South Dakota 0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Tennessee 0.27 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Texas 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Utah 0.33 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02
Vermont 0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Virginia 0.28 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Washington 0.22 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02
West Virginia 0.44 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.03
Wisconsin 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Wyoming 0.42 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
Average 0.27 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
SHORT-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing, Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax 
Revenue and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the property tax of the corresponding state.  
Table 3b - Long-run Elasticities with respect to Property Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama 0.84 -0.51 0.08 0.00 -0.05 0.12 0.07 0.00
Alaska 0.17 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Arizona 0.43 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00
Arkansas 0.43 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00
California 0.41 -0.23 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00
Colorado 0.37 -0.20 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00
Connecticut 0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Delaware 0.55 -0.32 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.00
Washington DC 0.56 -0.32 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.00
Florida 0.25 -0.13 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
Georgia 0.26 -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Hawaii 0.95 -0.62 0.09 0.00 -0.06 0.14 0.09 0.00
Idaho 0.29 -0.16 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Illinois 0.09 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Indiana 0.19 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Iowa 0.13 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Kansas 0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Kentucky 0.29 -0.15 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Louisiana 1.60 -1.22 0.13 0.00 -0.09 0.26 0.17 0.00
Maine 0.16 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Maryland 0.29 -0.15 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Massachusetts 0.19 -0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Michigan 0.11 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Minnesota 0.19 -0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Mississippi 0.46 -0.26 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.00
Missouri 0.23 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00
Montana 0.25 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
Nebraska 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Nevada 0.44 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00
New Hampshire 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
New Jersey 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
New Mexico 0.42 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00
New York 0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
North Carolina 0.25 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
North Dakota 0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Ohio 0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Oklahoma 0.28 -0.15 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Oregon 0.23 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00
Pennsylvania 0.11 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Rhode Island 0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
South Carolina 0.36 -0.20 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00
South Dakota 0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Tennessee 0.30 -0.16 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Texas 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Utah 0.36 -0.20 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00
Vermont 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Virginia 0.31 -0.16 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
Washington 0.24 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
West Virginia 0.48 -0.27 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.00
Wisconsin 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Wyoming 0.46 -0.26 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.00
Average 0.30 -0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00
LONG-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing, Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax 
Revenue and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the property tax of the corresponding state.  
Table 4a - Short-run Elasticities with respect to Dividend-Income Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama -1.02 0.22 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.12 -0.27 -0.05
Alaska -1.24 0.42 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 -0.07
Arizona -1.21 0.35 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.15 -0.31 -0.06
Arkansas -1.27 0.36 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.16 -0.32 -0.07
California -1.30 0.37 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.16 -0.33 -0.07
Colorado -1.25 0.37 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.16 -0.31 -0.07
Connecticut -1.38 0.47 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.33 -0.07
Delaware -1.19 0.32 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.15 -0.31 -0.06
Washington DC -1.22 0.32 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.15 -0.32 -0.06
Florida -1.21 0.39 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 -0.06
Georgia -1.32 0.42 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.17 -0.33 -0.07
Hawaii -1.10 0.17 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.12 -0.30 -0.06
Idaho -1.35 0.42 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.17 -0.34 -0.07
Illinois -1.34 0.46 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.32 -0.07
Indiana -1.30 0.43 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.17 -0.32 -0.07
Iowa -1.26 0.43 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 -0.07
Kansas -1.40 0.47 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.18 -0.34 -0.07
Kentucky -1.31 0.41 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.17 -0.32 -0.07
Louisiana -0.80 -0.06 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.07 -0.23 -0.05
Maine -1.43 0.47 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.18 -0.35 -0.08
Maryland -1.28 0.40 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.16 -0.32 -0.07
Massachusetts -1.47 0.47 0.00 -0.26 0.00 -0.19 -0.37 -0.08
Michigan -1.35 0.46 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.32 -0.07
Minnesota -1.38 0.45 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.18 -0.34 -0.07
Mississippi -1.22 0.35 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.15 -0.31 -0.06
Missouri -1.22 0.40 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 -0.06
Montana -1.21 0.39 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 -0.06
Nebraska -1.44 0.50 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.19 -0.34 -0.08
Nevada -1.14 0.34 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.14 -0.29 -0.06
New Hampshire -1.38 0.48 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.33 -0.07
New Jersey -1.36 0.47 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.32 -0.07
New Mexico -1.24 0.36 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.15 -0.32 -0.06
New York -1.40 0.47 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.18 -0.34 -0.07
North Carolina -1.35 0.43 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.17 -0.33 -0.07
North Dakota -1.36 0.46 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.32 -0.07
Ohio -1.35 0.46 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.32 -0.07
Oklahoma -1.32 0.41 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.17 -0.33 -0.07
Oregon -1.40 0.44 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.18 -0.35 -0.07
Pennsylvania -1.34 0.46 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.17 -0.32 -0.07
Rhode Island -1.41 0.47 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.18 -0.34 -0.07
South Carolina -1.30 0.39 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.16 -0.33 -0.07
South Dakota -1.27 0.43 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 -0.07
Tennessee -1.28 0.40 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.16 -0.32 -0.07
Texas -1.30 0.46 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.17 -0.31 -0.07
Utah -1.30 0.39 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.16 -0.33 -0.07
Vermont -1.44 0.49 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.19 -0.34 -0.08
Virginia -1.29 0.40 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.16 -0.32 -0.07
Washington -1.22 0.40 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 -0.06
West Virginia -1.20 0.34 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.15 -0.31 -0.06
Wisconsin -1.43 0.49 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.19 -0.34 -0.08
Wyoming -1.13 0.33 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.14 -0.29 -0.06
Average -1.29 0.40 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.16 -0.32 -0.07
SHORT-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing, Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax Revenue 
and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the dividend-income tax of the corresponding state.  
Table 4b - Long-run Elasticities with respect to Dividend-Income Tax Rates
STATE Tax Revenue Wages Population Consumption Housing Public Good Hours of Work Welfare
Alabama -1.10 0.25 -0.08 -0.21 0.05 -0.12 -0.28 0.00
Alaska -1.34 0.46 -0.10 -0.21 0.06 -0.16 -0.31 0.00
Arizona -1.30 0.39 -0.10 -0.22 0.06 -0.15 -0.31 0.00
Arkansas -1.37 0.40 -0.10 -0.23 0.06 -0.16 -0.33 0.00
California -1.40 0.41 -0.10 -0.24 0.07 -0.17 -0.34 0.00
Colorado -1.35 0.41 -0.10 -0.22 0.06 -0.16 -0.32 0.00
Connecticut -1.49 0.51 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.34 0.00
Delaware -1.29 0.35 -0.09 -0.23 0.06 -0.15 -0.32 0.00
Washington DC -1.32 0.36 -0.10 -0.23 0.06 -0.15 -0.32 0.00
Florida -1.31 0.43 -0.10 -0.21 0.06 -0.16 -0.30 0.00
Georgia -1.43 0.46 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.17 -0.33 0.00
Hawaii -1.18 0.21 -0.09 -0.24 0.06 -0.13 -0.31 0.00
Idaho -1.45 0.46 -0.11 -0.24 0.07 -0.17 -0.34 0.00
Illinois -1.45 0.51 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.33 0.00
Indiana -1.41 0.47 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.17 -0.32 0.00
Iowa -1.37 0.47 -0.10 -0.21 0.07 -0.17 -0.31 0.00
Kansas -1.51 0.52 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.19 -0.34 0.00
Kentucky -1.41 0.45 -0.10 -0.23 0.07 -0.17 -0.33 0.00
Louisiana -0.87 -0.03 -0.07 -0.21 0.04 -0.07 -0.24 0.00
Maine -1.54 0.51 -0.12 -0.24 0.07 -0.19 -0.35 0.00
Maryland -1.39 0.44 -0.10 -0.22 0.07 -0.17 -0.32 0.00
Massachusetts -1.58 0.52 -0.12 -0.26 0.07 -0.19 -0.37 0.00
Michigan -1.46 0.51 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.33 0.00
Minnesota -1.49 0.49 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.18 -0.34 0.00
Mississippi -1.32 0.39 -0.10 -0.22 0.06 -0.16 -0.32 0.00
Missouri -1.32 0.44 -0.10 -0.21 0.06 -0.16 -0.30 0.00
Montana -1.31 0.43 -0.10 -0.21 0.06 -0.16 -0.30 0.00
Nebraska -1.56 0.54 -0.12 -0.23 0.08 -0.19 -0.35 0.00
Nevada -1.24 0.38 -0.09 -0.21 0.06 -0.15 -0.29 0.00
New Hampshire -1.49 0.52 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.34 0.00
New Jersey -1.47 0.51 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.33 0.00
New Mexico -1.34 0.40 -0.10 -0.23 0.06 -0.16 -0.32 0.00
New York -1.51 0.51 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.18 -0.34 0.00
North Carolina -1.45 0.47 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.18 -0.34 0.00
North Dakota -1.47 0.51 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.33 0.00
Ohio -1.46 0.50 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.33 0.00
Oklahoma -1.42 0.45 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.17 -0.33 0.00
Oregon -1.51 0.49 -0.11 -0.24 0.07 -0.18 -0.35 0.00
Pennsylvania -1.45 0.50 -0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.32 0.00
Rhode Island -1.52 0.51 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.19 -0.35 0.00
South Carolina -1.40 0.43 -0.10 -0.23 0.07 -0.17 -0.33 0.00
South Dakota -1.37 0.47 -0.10 -0.21 0.07 -0.17 -0.31 0.00
Tennessee -1.38 0.44 -0.10 -0.23 0.06 -0.17 -0.33 0.00
Texas -1.41 0.50 -0.11 -0.21 0.07 -0.17 -0.31 0.00
Utah -1.40 0.43 -0.10 -0.23 0.07 -0.17 -0.33 0.00
Vermont -1.56 0.54 -0.12 -0.23 0.07 -0.19 -0.35 0.00
Virginia -1.40 0.44 -0.10 -0.23 0.07 -0.17 -0.33 0.00
Washington -1.31 0.44 -0.10 -0.21 0.06 -0.16 -0.30 0.00
West Virginia -1.30 0.38 -0.10 -0.22 0.06 -0.15 -0.31 0.00
Wisconsin -1.55 0.54 -0.12 -0.23 0.07 -0.19 -0.35 0.00
Wyoming -1.22 0.37 -0.09 -0.21 0.06 -0.15 -0.29 0.00
Average -1.39 0.44 -0.10 -0.22 0.07 -0.17 -0.32 0.00
LONG-RUN ELASTICITIES
Notes: Wages, Consumption, Housing, Public Good, Hours of Work and Welfare represent elasticities of per capita values, while Tax 
Revenue and Population represent elasticities of state-level values, all with respect to the dividend-income tax of the corresponding state.  
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics
STATE Wage Tax Dividend Tax Property Tax Sales Tax Tax Revenue (CA=1) Wage (CA=1) Population (CA=1) Housing (CA=1) Tax Index (CA=1)
Alabama 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.04 0.08 0.74 0.13 0.16 0.73
Alaska 0.40 0.40 1.73 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.02 0.02 1.10
Arizona 0.44 0.44 0.85 0.06 0.13 0.82 0.18 0.21 0.94
Arkansas 0.47 0.47 0.81 0.06 0.07 0.68 0.08 0.10 0.98
California 0.48 0.48 0.82 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Colorado 0.45 0.45 0.95 0.03 0.08 0.90 0.13 0.16 0.98
Connecticut 0.45 0.45 2.29 0.06 0.12 1.15 0.10 0.11 1.26
Delaware 0.46 0.46 0.68 0.00 0.02 0.94 0.02 0.03 0.89
Washington DC 0.47 0.47 0.65 0.06 0.01 1.45 0.02 0.02 0.91
Florida 0.40 0.40 1.31 0.06 0.31 0.79 0.50 0.66 1.03
Georgia 0.46 0.46 1.23 0.04 0.17 0.83 0.26 0.30 1.09
Hawaii 0.48 0.48 0.37 0.04 0.05 0.78 0.04 0.04 0.76
Idaho 0.48 0.48 1.10 0.06 0.03 0.66 0.04 0.05 1.09
Illinois 0.43 0.43 2.50 0.06 0.25 0.94 0.35 0.39 1.25
Indiana 0.44 0.44 1.57 0.06 0.13 0.74 0.18 0.20 1.13
Iowa 0.40 0.40 2.04 0.05 0.05 0.71 0.08 0.10 1.15
Kansas 0.47 0.47 2.02 0.05 0.06 0.73 0.08 0.09 1.24
Kentucky 0.46 0.46 1.12 0.06 0.08 0.72 0.12 0.14 1.06
Louisiana 0.40 0.40 0.24 0.04 0.09 0.76 0.12 0.14 0.55
Maine 0.49 0.49 1.68 0.05 0.03 0.70 0.04 0.05 1.23
Maryland 0.45 0.45 1.15 0.05 0.13 0.95 0.16 0.17 1.05
Massachusetts 0.46 0.52 1.48 0.05 0.18 1.09 0.18 0.21 1.18
Michigan 0.44 0.44 2.25 0.06 0.21 0.86 0.28 0.33 1.24
Minnesota 0.47 0.47 1.48 0.07 0.15 0.88 0.14 0.17 1.17
Mississippi 0.45 0.45 0.78 0.07 0.06 0.64 0.08 0.09 0.94
Missouri 0.40 0.40 1.40 0.04 0.09 0.76 0.16 0.20 1.04
Montana 0.40 0.40 1.34 0.00 0.02 0.64 0.03 0.04 1.02
Nebraska 0.47 0.47 2.84 0.06 0.04 0.70 0.05 0.06 1.34
Nevada 0.40 0.40 0.87 0.07 0.05 0.83 0.07 0.09 0.90
New Hampshire 0.40 0.45 2.74 0.00 0.02 0.87 0.04 0.04 1.25
New Jersey 0.44 0.44 2.67 0.07 0.25 1.07 0.24 0.26 1.28
New Mexico 0.46 0.46 0.84 0.05 0.04 0.72 0.05 0.07 0.96
New York 0.47 0.47 1.83 0.04 0.55 1.18 0.54 0.59 1.22
North Carolina 0.47 0.47 1.23 0.04 0.20 0.77 0.25 0.32 1.10
North Dakota 0.44 0.44 2.29 0.05 0.01 0.65 0.02 0.02 1.24
Ohio 0.44 0.44 2.13 0.06 0.22 0.79 0.32 0.37 1.22
Oklahoma 0.47 0.47 1.15 0.05 0.06 0.70 0.10 0.12 1.07
Oregon 0.49 0.49 1.31 0.00 0.06 0.78 0.10 0.12 1.15
Pennsylvania 0.43 0.43 2.27 0.06 0.25 0.86 0.35 0.41 1.23
Rhode Island 0.47 0.47 1.87 0.07 0.02 0.82 0.03 0.03 1.24
South Carolina 0.47 0.47 0.93 0.05 0.08 0.70 0.12 0.16 1.02
South Dakota 0.40 0.40 2.12 0.04 0.01 0.63 0.02 0.03 1.16
Tennessee 0.40 0.46 1.12 0.07 0.09 0.77 0.17 0.21 1.01
Texas 0.40 0.40 3.00 0.06 0.30 0.88 0.66 0.73 1.26
Utah 0.47 0.47 0.93 0.05 0.05 0.73 0.07 0.07 1.02
Vermont 0.48 0.48 2.53 0.06 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.02 1.32
Virginia 0.46 0.46 1.08 0.04 0.16 0.91 0.21 0.25 1.04
Washington 0.40 0.40 1.34 0.07 0.14 0.89 0.18 0.21 1.04
West Virginia 0.45 0.45 0.76 0.06 0.04 0.67 0.05 0.06 0.92
Wisconsin 0.47 0.47 2.80 0.05 0.13 0.75 0.15 0.19 1.33
Wyoming 0.40 0.40 0.84 0.04 0.01 0.78 0.01 0.02 0.88
Average 0.45 0.45 1.49 0.05 0.13 0.82 0.16 0.19 1.08
STATE-LEVEL DATA
Notes:  CA=1 means that the numbers have been adjusted with respect to the State of California. All variables represent the state-level data, except for Tax Index that has been calcualted according to the model. 
Table A2 - Population Regression Results 
 Regression Results  
 
 Implied Welfare Shares 
 Dependent Variable: Population Ratio    Due to 1C L P Nφ φ φ φ+ + + =  
C
L P
φ
φ φ+
 0.17 [0.16,0.17]  
 
Cφ  0.12 
      
L
L P
φ
φ φ+
 0.87 [0.87,0.87]  
 
Lφ  0.64 
      
P
L P
φ
φ φ+
 0.13 [0.13,0.13]  
 
Pφ  0.10 
      
N
L P
φ
φ φ+
 0.19 [0.19,0.20]  
 
Nφ  0.14 
      
      
R-Squared 0.99     
Sample Size 65,025     
 
Notes: Values inside of the brackets represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimation is by restricted least squares. The regression includes a 
constant that is not shown here. 
Table A3 - Tax Revenue Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: Tax Revenue Ratio 
 Restricted Regression  Unrestricted Regression 
 (1)  (2) 
Coefficient of  
Right Hand Side 
1.00 
[1.00, 1.00]  
0.97 
[0.96,0.97] 
    
R-Squared 0.93  0.93 
Sample Size 65,025  65,025 
 
Notes: Values inside of the brackets represent 95% confidence intervals. Restricted regression is by restricted least squares, while unrestricted 
regression is by OLS. All regressions include a constant that is not shown here. 
 
 
 
 
Table A4 - Trade Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: Trade Ratio 
 Restricted Regression  Unrestricted Regression 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Coefficient of 
Population Ratio 
1.00 
[1.00, 1.00] 
1.00 
[1.00, 1.00]   
1.17 
[1.15,1.18] 
1.20 
[1.18,1.21]  
        
Coefficient of  
Tax Ratio 
1.00  
[1.00, 1.00]  
1.00 
[1.00, 1.00]  
0.97 
[0.92,1.02]  
1.67 
[1.61,1.74] 
        
R-Squared 0.45 0.44 0.05  0.45 0.44 0.05 
Sample Size 65,025 65,025 65,025  65,025 65,025 65,025 
 
Notes: Values inside of the brackets represent 95% confidence intervals. Restricted regression is by restricted least squares, while unrestricted 
regression is by OLS. All regressions include a constant that is not shown here. 
